In this study, we report a patient (J.S.) who, following populations, J.S. showed impairment in: the recognition of, and autonomic responding to, angry and disgusted trauma to the right frontal region, including the orbitofrontal cortex, presented with 'acquired expressions; attributing the emotions of fear, anger and embarrassment to story protagonists; and the sociopathy'. His behaviour was notably aberrant and marked by high levels of aggression and a callous identification of violations of social behaviour. The findings are discussed with reference to models regarding the role disregard for others. A series of experimental investigations were conducted to address the cognitive of the orbitofrontal cortex in the control of aggression. It is suggested that J.S.'s impairment is due to a reduced dysfunction that might underpin his profoundly aberrant behaviour. His performance was contrasted with that of ability to generate expectations of others' negative emotional reactions, in particular anger. In healthy a second patient (C.L.A.), who also presented with a grave dysexecutive syndrome but no socially aberrant individuals, these representations act to suppress behaviour that is inappropriate in specific social contexts. behaviour, and five inmates of Wormwood Scrubs prison with developmental psychopathy. While J.S. showed no Moreover, it is proposed that the orbitofrontal cortex may be implicated specifically either in the generation of these reversal learning impairment, he presented with severe difficulty in emotional expression recognition, autonomic expectations or the use of these expectations to suppress inappropriate behaviour. responding and social cognition. Unlike the comparison
Introduction
Frontal lobe damage has long been linked to emotional/ behaviour are reported both when the lesions are acquired early in life and when they occur in adulthood (e.g. Burgess personality changes such as euphoria, irresponsibility, lack of affect and lack of concern for the present or future (e.g. and Wood, 1990; Price et al., 1990; Pennington and Bennetto, 1993; Grafman et al., 1996) . For example, Burgess and Wood Hecaen and Albert, 1978; Stuss and Benson, 1986) . Patients with aberrant behaviour following frontal lesions have been reported that 'Following serious [frontal] brain injury, many patients find it difficult to tolerate frustration and react reported to show impairments in emotional expression recognition and perform poorly on selfimpulsively to minor forms of pressure or provocation' (Burgess and Wood, 1990, p. 122) . The aggression is sporadic, report measures of empathy (e.g. Grattan et al., 1994; Eslinger, 1998) . In addition, frontal lobe damage has been stress-related and directed more frequently against physical objects than against other individuals. Within the frontal linked to impairments in social behaviour. Patients with frontal lobe lesions have been described as presenting lobes, it is orbitofrontal (ventral) and medial frontal damage that has been linked primarily to these emotional and social diminished social awareness and a lack of concern for social rules (e.g. Lishman, 1968; Blumer and Benson, 1975; Hecaen behavioural changes (e.g. Damasio, 1994; Volavka, 1995; Grafman et al., 1996) . and Albert, 1978; Stuss et al., 1992; . Frequently, increased levels of aggression and aberrant Probably the best-documented case of a patient with
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emotional and behavioural changes following lesions to the learn to avoid the high reward, net loss packs in favour of the low reward, net gain packs. Healthy participants learned to orbitofrontal cortex is the patient E.V.R. (e.g. Eslinger and Damasio, 1985; Damasio et al., 1990 Damasio et al., , 1991 Saver and take from the low reward packs and showed skin conductance responses (i.e. warning somatic markers) before the selection Damasio, 1991; Bechara et al., 1994 Bechara et al., , 1997 . Prior to his orbitofrontal meningioma, E.V.R. was a successful of a card from the disadvantageous packs. In contrast, patients with ventromedial damage continued to choose from the professional and was happily married. However, subsequent to his surgery, his social conduct was profoundly affected.
disadvantageous packs and failed to show skin conductance responses before their choices from these packs. He was divorced twice and entered into disastrous business ventures that led to predictable bankruptcy. This case Four other major proposals have been offered to account for the aberrant emotional and social behaviour of patients prompted Damasio's introduction of the term 'acquired sociopathy'. With this, he aimed to characterize individuals with frontal lobe lesions. Rolls proposed that the inappropriate social behaviour shown by patients such as E.V.R. may 'be who, following acquired lesions of the orbitofrontal cortex, fulfilled the DSM-III (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of related to a dysfunction in altering behaviour appropriately in response to a change in reinforcement contingencies' mental disorders) diagnostic criteria for 'sociopathic disorder'. These diagnostic criteria include being 'reckless (Rolls, , p. 1438 . He suggested that orbitofrontal cortex is associated with 'rapid stimulus-reinforcement association regarding others' personal safety', 'lack of remorse' and 'defective planning' (DSM-III, 1980) . Moreover, Damasio learning, and the correction of these associations when reinforcement contingencies in the environment change' and colleagues proposed that psychopathy might be the developmental counterpart of the clinical picture presented (Rolls, , p. 1437 ; see also Dias et al., 1996; LeDoux, 1998) . He argued that 'the orbitofrontal cortex is involved by such patients (Damasio et al., 1990) . Psychopathy is characterized by high levels of aggression and antisocial in emotional responses by correcting stimulus-reinforcement associations when they become inappropriate' , behaviour performed without guilt or empathy for the victim (Hare, 1991) .
p. 1438). Rolls and colleagues investigated this hypothesis using a visual discrimination task that required the patient to Damasio proposed that impairment in a 'somatic marker system' caused the aberrant social behaviour (e.g. Damasio, learn that touching one stimulus when it appeared on a computer screen resulted in reward while touching another 1994). This system tags internal representations with a somatic (body state) marker, i.e. an autonomic nervous system visual stimulus resulted in punishment (Rolls et al., 1994) . After the patients learnt the visual discrimination, the response. These somatic markers aid decision making: they 'force attention on the negative outcome to which a given reinforcement contingencies were reversed unexpectedly.
Patients with lesions to the orbitofrontal cortex made more action may lead, and function as an automated alarm signal that says: Beware of danger ahead if you choose the option errors following contingency reversal, and completed fewer reversals than control populations with either more that leads to this outcome. The signal may lead you to reject, immediately, the negative course of action and thus make dorsolateral frontal or posterior lesions. Moreover, the patient's task performance correlated inversely with their level you choose among other alternatives. The automated signal protects you against future losses, without further ado, of disinhibited/socially inappropriate behaviour, as indexed by care-giver report. and then allows you to choose among other alternatives' (Damasio, 1994, p. 173, italics in original) .
Grafman interpreted the patient's impairment in terms of an inability to access 'social schema knowledge' stored in Two major findings are associated with the somatic marker hypothesis. First, patients with lesions to the ventromedial the frontal lobes (e.g. Grafman, 1994; Grafman et al., 1996) . Social schema knowledge is thought to inhibit aberrant frontal cortex fail to show autonomic responses to visually presented social stimuli (scenes of social disaster, mutilation behaviour. Patients with orbitofrontal cortex lesions who cannot access social schema knowledge fail to inhibit aberrant and nudity) under passive viewing conditions (Damasio et al., 1990 (Damasio et al., , 1991 . Passive viewing conditions require the behaviour, such as physical threats and aggression. However, this position has received relatively little empirical testing. participant only to look at the pictures of scenes. It should be noted that these patients did, however, show appropriate Dimitrov and colleagues found that some patients with frontal lobe lesions showed atypical performance on a task autonomic responses to the same stimuli under active viewing conditions. These involved attention-inducing instructions investigating ability to rate solutions to social problems according to their effectiveness (Dimitrov et al., 1996) . such as being asked to describe the pictures. Secondly, patients with lesions to the ventromedial frontal cortex However, the patients who showed atypical performance were also those with the lowest IQs and poorest performance perform poorly on the Four-Pack Card-Playing task (e.g. Bechara et al., 1994 Bechara et al., , 1997 . In this task, participants are on the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST). It is thus unclear whether generalized intellectual or executive presented with four packs of cards. Two packs of cards result in high reward but even higher punishments and, if played difficulties might explain their impaired performance on the experimental task. Moreover, Saver and Damasio (Saver and continuously, result in a net loss. The two other packs result in low reward but even lower punishments and, if played Damasio, 1991) found that, contrary to Grafman's hypothesis, E.V.R. showed intact social knowledge on tasks such as the continuously, result in a net gain. The participants have to cartoon predictions test (O'Sullivan and Guilford, 1976) and an Accident and Emergency Department after he was found the moral judgement interview (Colby and Kohlberg, 1987) .
collapsed and unconscious with evidence of trauma to the Baron-Cohen interpreted the patient's impairment in terms right frontal region. There was some suggestion of a witnessed of damage to the neural circuit mediating Theory of Mind generalized convulsion, but no other history was available. ( Baron-Cohen, 1995) . Theory of Mind is defined as the On admission, the patient was confused, with a reduced level ability to represent the mental states of other individuals. The of consciousness. On examination, he presented with a suggestion is that individuals who, because of orbitofrontal Glasgow coma scale of 9. There were disconjuntate eye damage, cannot represent the mental states of others will be movements with divergent squint but no nystagmus, flaccid unable to modulate their emotional and social behaviour. In tone with increased reflexes and down going plantars. He line with this, Price and colleagues reported two cases who was first admitted to the Intensive Therapy Unit and then performed poorly on a test of visual perspective taking (Price transferred to the neurological ward where he stayed until et al ., 1990) , and a SPECT neuroimaging study reported that February 1997. During this time, he was noted to present with the orbitofrontal cortex was implicated in Theory of Mind memory loss and a 'dysexecutive syndrome'. In particular, it processing (Baron-Cohen et al., 1994) . However, it is unclear was noted that his behaviour was gravely disturbed. He whether visual perspective taking requires the representation behaved bizarrely, for example riding around on a hospital of mental states (Leslie and Frith, 1988) . However, two other trolley (gurney), he was uncooperative and he had several functional imaging studies investigating the neural substrate unpredictable episodes of aggression. An EEG showed of Theory of Mind reported medial frontal, rather than irregular slowing which had a maximum anteriorly. An orbitofrontal, cortex involvement (Fletcher et al., 1995; Goel enhanced CT scan showed low-density abnormalities in both et al., 1995) .
frontal lobes involving the orbitofrontal cortex. In addition, Brothers (Brothers, 1995 (Brothers, , 1997 interpreted her patients' there was involvement of the left temporal lobe, almost impairment in terms of a social 'editor'. This editor is certainly comprising the left amygdala because the uncus 'specialised for processing others' social intentions . . . ' was of a slightly lower density on the left, and the left (Brothers, 1997, p. 27) . It attributes others' intentions by temporal horn was not visible (see Fig. 1 ). responding to significant gestures and expressions. The editor Subsequently, he was transferred to a long-term 'encourages the rest of the brain to report on features of the rehabilitation hospital. During his stay, he assaulted and social environment' (Brothers, 1997, p. 15) ; effectively, it wounded a member of staff, frequently threw objects and focuses attention on stimuli, such as faces and expressions, furniture at people and was aggressive towards other patients. that are particularly important in social interactions. The editor Staff and patients felt at risk and frightened by his presence. is considered a unitary system 'specialised for responding to In July 1997, he was admitted to the National Hospital for social signals of all kinds, a system that would ultimately Neurology and Neurosurgery for further evaluation of his construct representations of the mind' (Brothers, 1997, p. grave behavioural disturbances. An MRI scan was performed; 27). She specifically argues against the idea of dissociable however, its results were confounded by movement artefacts. systems for what she terms 'cold' social cognition (i.e. the During his admission, it was established that he had no attribution of belief; Theory of Mind) and 'hot' social psychiatric history prior to his accident. He was described cognition (i.e. processing the emotional expressions of by a relative as being premorbidly a quiet, rather withdrawn others).
person who was never aggressive. Following discharge from Here we report a patient, J.S., who, following a head injury, the National Hospital, he was re-admitted to a long-term developed a marked dysexecutive syndrome, characterized by rehabilitation hospital. 'acquired sociopathy'. Our aim was to investigate which dysfunctional cognitive systems underpin his profound emotional and social behavioural impairment. We compared
Behavioural assessment
his performance with that of another patient with grave Since the injury, J.S. fulfilled the DSM-IV criteria for dysexecutive syndrome, C.L.A., who did not present with Antisocial Personality Disorder (DSM-IV, 1994). J.S. 'failed 'acquired sociopathy'. Our aim was to disentangle those to conform to social norms' and was notably 'irritable and executive systems that may be crucial for social cognition aggressive'. His episodes of property damage and violence from those that are crucial for general executive processing.
were frequent and were elicited after little provocation; e.g. We also compared the performance of J.S. with a small an alteration in routine. He was 'reckless regarding others' population of patients with developmental psychopathy. Our personal safety'; on one occasion he continued to push around aim was to determine the commonalties and differences a wheelchair-bound patient despite her screams of terror. His between 'acquired sociopathy' and developmental 'lack of remorse' was striking; he never expressed any regrets psychopathy.
about the nurses he hit. He failed to accept responsibility for his actions, justifying his violent episodes in terms of the failures of others (e.g. they were too slow). He frequently
Case report
'failed to plan ahead', leaving the hospital regularly to wander J.S. is a 56-year-old, right-handed man who worked as an electrical engineer. In November 1996, he was admitted to about London with 'no clear goal for the period of travel or clear idea about when the travel will terminate'. He showed an additional visual recognition memory test, his performance was again in the low average range (Topographical 'an inability to sustain consistent work behaviour'. Since the accident, he could not hold employment due to his Recognition Memory; Warrington, 1996) . His nominal skills were impaired. His performance was poor on the Graded interpersonal difficulties. In summary, J.S. fulfilled the criteria for acquired sociopathy except that he lacked premorbid Difficulty Naming Test (McKenna and Warrington, 1980) and on the Oldfield picture-naming test (Oldfield and Wingfield, aberrant behaviour. While J.S. showed reduced 'empathy ' and profoundly 1965) . Few semantic errors were present in both tasks. J.S.'s single word comprehension was within the average range on disturbed social interactions, there were no indications of self-neglect, changes in eating habits, hyper-sexuality or a stringent Synonym Test (Warrington et al., 1998) . Visuoperceptual and visuo-spatial skills, as assessed by two subtests oral exploratory behaviour. In summary, J.S. showed no indications of the Klüver-Bucy syndrome.
of the Visual Object and Space Perception Battery, were within normal limits (Warrington and James, 1991) .
Neuropsychological assessment
J.S. was assessed on a shortened form of the Wechsler Adult
Frontal executive functions
His performance on tests sensitive to frontal lobe damage Intelligence Scale-Revised (WAIS-R) and obtained a verbal and a performance IQ in the average range (see Table 1 ). On was impaired (see Table 1 ). His responses on the Cognitive Estimates Test (Shallice and Evans, 1978) were bizarre (e.g. Raven Advanced Matrices (Raven, 1965) , he obtained a good average score. Reading performance on the National Adult weight of a full pint of milk ϭ '. . . 10 . . . no 7 pounds . . .'). On the WCST (Nelson, 1976) , he obtained only three Reading Test (NART) (Nelson and Willison, 1991) gave an estimated premorbid level of functioning in the superior categories, making several perseverative errors, and the test was abandoned due to low frustration tolerance. On the range. On the recognition memory test (Warrington, 1984) , his performance was in the high average range for verbal Hayling Sentence Completion Test (Burgess and Shallice, 1996) , he performed flawlessly but slowly on the response material and in the low average range for visual material. On initiation section. However, on the response suppression but no behavioural disturbance (see Appendix A for patient details) on tests of reversal learning, emotional expression section, he was unable to produce words that were unrelated to the sentence. For example, for 'the captain wanted to stay processing and social cognition. For the reversal learning, expression recognition and autonomic responding and social with the sinking . . .' he could not suppress the response 'ship . . .'. On a proverb interpretation task, he gave a cognition tasks, J.S.'s performance was contrasted with that of five male prison inmates with developmental psychopathy concrete interpretation for 6/10 proverbs. However, he had no difficulty with the Weigl Colour Form Sorting Test (Weigl, and five non-psychopathic control inmates held in the same institution (see Appendix B for population details). For the 1941), the Stroop test (Stroop, 1935) and the Trail-Making Test (Army Individual Test Battery, 1944) . In addition, his social cognition tasks, J.S.'s performance is also contrasted with 10 age-and IQ-matched normal participants (mean speed of performance on the Trail-Making Test was normal.
age ϭ 54 years, SD ϭ 7; mean NART IQ ϭ 104, SD ϭ 7).
Comment
J.S. presented with acquired sociopathy. His cognitive profile
Reversal learning tasks
was characterized by marked frontal dysexecutive Two reversal learning tasks were administered (the Fourimpairments and nominal difficulties. In the following Pack and the One-Pack Card-Playing tasks). These tasks experimental investigation, we explored the basis of J.S.'s were developed from Damasio's somatic marker hypothesis acquired sociopathy. and Newman's response set modulation hypothesis (Newman et al., 1987; . Both tasks assess the participant's ability to reverse a learnt response and are thus
Experimental investigation
considered together below (see Dias et al., 1996; Rolls, 1998) The following experimental investigation was conducted over 1 week (July 17-24, 1997) . This was introduced to J.S. as a way of understanding his behaviour more fully. He stated Task 1: the Four-Pack Card-Playing task that he enjoyed participating as he found the ward boring.
Damasio and colleagues have reported that patients with In order to investigate J.S.'s acquired sociopathy, reversal acquired sociopathy are impaired on the Four-Pack Cardlearning, expression recognition, emotional responding and Playing task (Bechara et al., 1994 (Bechara et al., , 1997 . We wished to social cognition tests were carried out. determine whether J.S. would show impairment.
Procedure. This task used a version of the protocol Control subjects J.S.'s performance was contrasted against that of a patient, described by Bechara and colleagues (Bechara et al., 1994) . In this task, participants are presented with four packs of C.L.A., who presented with a grave dysexecutive syndrome cards. Two packs of cards result in high reward but even the psychopathic and non-psychopathic inmates). J.S. played few cards and stopped after the first couple of 'punishments'. higher punishments and, if played continuously, result in a net loss. The two other packs result in low reward but even Two of the non-psychopathic inmates responded similarly. C.L.A. and the remaining three non-psychopathic inmates lower punishments and, if played continuously, result in a net gain. The participants have to learn to avoid the high played relatively few cards. In striking contrast, the psychopathic inmates played, on average, almost double the reward, net loss packs in favour of the low reward, net gain packs.
number of cards. Indeed, three continued playing the game until its end, resulting in the loss of all their tokens.
Results. In Table 2 
Comment. The results of Task 2 replicated and extended
psychopathic and non-psychopathic inmates). J.S. performed those of Task 1 indicating that J.S. had no reversal learning well within the range of the psychopathic and nonimpairment. In other words, he could reverse his responses psychopathic inmates and the normal control participants to stimuli that previously had been associated with reward reported by Bechara and colleagues (Bechara et al., 1994) .
when they became associated with punishment. This suggests In contrast, C.L.A. performed poorly, perseverating in his that his behavioural difficulties cannot be attributed easily to choice of pack B (82% of his responses). disruption within those systems that are crucial for reversal learning.
Comment. J.S.'s unimpaired performance on the Four-Pack
Card-Playing task suggests that he did not present with somatic marker impairment. Moreover, given the task's
Expression recognition and emotional
reversal learning, J.S. showed unimpaired reversal learning.
responding tasks
Two tasks were designed to investigate J.S.'s processing of emotional stimuli. In the first, we investigated his ability
Task 2: the One-Pack Card-Playing task
to recognize and autonomically respond to human facial In Task 2, we wished to determine J.S.'s performance on a expressions (Task 3). In the second, we investigated his second reversal learning task that psychopathic individuals autonomic responses to more naturalistic stimuli, including perform poorly (e.g. Newman et al., 1987) .
human expressions and threatening objects (Task 4).
Procedure. This task used a version of the protocol previously described by Newman and colleagues (Newman et al., 1987) . In this task, the participant has to decide
Task 3: facial expression processing
Patients with aberrant behaviour following orbitofrontal whether to play a card. Initially, the participant's choices to play are reinforced, but as the number of trials increases, cortex lesions have been reported to show impairments in emotional expression recognition . We the probability of reward decreases. The participant should terminate his responding before he receives greater levels of wished to determine whether J.S. would show similar deficits. In addition, we wished to determine whether any recognition punishment than reward.
deficit/impairment in skin conductance response (SCR) generation would be selective to particular emotion
Results. In Table 2 , the performance of J.S. is contrasted with that of the comparison populations (patient C.L.A. and categories. analyses were used for all subject ϫ expression recognition comparisons. One-way ANOVAs were used for all between-subject by SCR to expression comparisons.
Procedure. This task was based on the paradigm described analyses were performed to explore J.S.'s ability relative to the comparison populations. In comparison with both inmate by Calder and colleagues (Calder et al., 1996) . This method assesses recognition of six emotion expressions: surprise, populations, J.S. was significantly impaired at recognizing happiness, anger, disgust and sadness, but not surprise and happiness, anger, disgust, sadness and fearfulness. The stimuli are continuous tone images where two expressions have been fearfulness. In comparison with C.L.A., J.S. was significantly impaired at recognizing anger and disgust, but not the morphed together.
Each face was presented to J.S. on a computer screen, other four expressions. Surprisingly, C.L.A. showed selective impairment in comparison with both inmate populations in with each stimulus subtending a horizontal visual angle of 3.6°and a vertical angle of 5.2°. There were six blocks of sadness recognition. In Table 3 , the autonomic responses of J.S. to the six stimuli. In each block, the 30 stimuli were presented in a randomized order. The first block was counted as practice expressions are contrasted with those of the inmate populations. J.S. was profoundly impaired in generating trials and the data obtained were not analysed. Each stimulus was presented for 3 s and there was a 4-6 s interval between autonomic responses to all emotional expressions other than surprise and happiness. ANOVAs (analyses of variance) each stimulus during which the screen was blank. J.S. was presented with a list of six response options (the six emotions) revealed that J.S. produced significantly lower SCRs to anger and disgust expressions than both comparison groups. and instructed to name the displayed expression. In addition, his SCR was recorded in the 1-3 s interval following However, J.S. only produced significantly lower SCRs than the non-psychopathic inmates to the sad and fearful stimulus onset.
expressions. His SCRs to sad and fearful expressions were not significantly less than those of the psychopathic inmates.
Results. In Table 3 , the performance of J.S. on expression recognition is contrasted with that of patient C.L.A., and the psychopathic and non-psychopathic inmates. Chi-square Comment. In this task, J.S. was found to show severe J.S.'s autonomic responses to emotional expressions using naturalistic images that may be more powerful motivators of autonomic activity than the Ekman and Friesen-based stimuli P Ͻ 0.05] and threatening objects versus neutral objects used in Task 3 (Ekman and Friesen, 1975) . In addition, we [F(1,36) ϭ 9.95; P Ͻ 0.01]. used other naturalistic stimuli (threatening and neutral objects) to explore whether his impaired autonomic responding was Comment. The SCR data obtained in Task 4 replicate and restricted to emotional expressions.
extend the results found in Task 3. J.S. was hyporesponsive not only to the expression stimuli but also to threatening objects.
Procedure. This task is based on a paradigm described by Given J.S.'s profound deficits in Tasks 3 and 4, we wanted Blair and colleagues (Blair et al., 1997) . The participant is to be certain that they could not be attributed to some general presented with 50 stimuli in two blocks. Each block of 25 impairment in face processing or the production of autonomic stimuli contains five sad, five angry and five neutral responses. Thus, we examined J.S.'s ability to process human naturalistic expressions, five threatening objects (e.g. pointed faces (Task 5) and to generate SCRs to basic stimuli (Task 6). weapons) and five neutral objects (e.g. household objects). The 25 stimuli within each block were presented in a random order. Moreover, block order was randomized across Task 5: face processing tasks participants. There was a 6-8 s interval between each To determine whether J.S. (and C.L.A.) could process facial stimulus. SCRs were recorded in the 1-3 s following stimulus stimuli adequately, we carried out the following series of onset. In order to ensure that J.S. was attending to the stimuli, tasks. he was asked to give a score between 1 and 10 concerning how much he liked the picture. 
Social cognition tasks
The following tasks addressed four aspects of social cognition. normal range.
First, J.S.'s ability to represent the emotions of others (Task 8). Secondly, his ability to represent the internal mental Comment. J.S.'s (and C.L.A.'s) satisfactory performances indicated that both patients had normal face processing skills. states of others (Task 9). Thirdly, his ability to process the appropriateness of behaviour in different social contexts (Tasks 10 and 11). Fourthly, his sensitivity to basic behavioural norms as they are embodied in the moral/
Task 6: autonomic responses to auditory stimuli
To determine J.S.'s ability to generate autonomic responses, conventional distinction test (Task 12). we investigated his responsiveness to basic auditory stimuli such as a loud noise, his own name and an unknown name.
Task 7: verbal comprehension
Because the social cognition tasks all involved story-type Procedure. In this task, three auditory stimuli were presented in six blocks. Within each block, the order of the stimuli, we investigated J.S.'s ability to understand complex verbal material using the verbal comprehension subtest of three stimuli was randomized. The three stimuli types were a clap, the participant's name and the name of a person the WAIS-R. J.S. obtained a high average score. This suggests normal verbal comprehension, and thus any impairment unknown to J.S. The SCR magnitude was recorded; defined as the greatest magnitude of departure from baseline occurring on the social cognition tasks could not be attributed to comprehension impairment. between 1 and 4 s after stimulus onset. The responses to the first four stimuli were considered practice trials and were not analysed.
Task 8: emotion attribution task
J.S.'s performance on Task 3 indicated that he was impaired
Results. In Table 5 , the performance of J.S. is contrasted with that of a subgroup of five of the 10 healthy normal in the recognition of emotional expressions. In Task 8, we investigated J.S.'s ability to attribute emotional states controls. A series of one-way ANOVAs revealed that J.S.'s SCRs were not significantly lower than those shown by the to others. controls for any of the three stimuli [F(1,28) ϭ 2.65, 2.16 and 0.89, n.s., for the clap, participant's name and unknown Procedure. This task used an expanded version of the paradigm described by Blair and colleagues (Blair et al., name, respectively] . A second series of one-way ANOVAs revealed that J.S. showed significantly larger responses to 1995). In this task, the participant was presented with 67 short stories describing emotional situations and was asked the clap and his own name than to the unknown name Procedure. This task involves the participant reading 24 stories describing naturalistic social situations and being C (i).
The task was scored according to the number of correct asked about why the characters behaved as they did (Happé, 1994 ). An example story is given in Appendix C (ii). attributions made for each story category. Any positive affect (including relieved, overjoyed and ecstatic) was scored as Three scores are generated from the participant's performance. The first, Total Score, indexes the participant's correct for the happiness stories. Any sad affect (including sad, upset and devastated) was scored as correct for the comprehension of the situation. The other two scores refer to the justifications the participant uses when interpreting sadness stories. Correct responses to the fearful stories included fearful, scared and petrified. Correct responses to the story characters' behaviour; i.e. reference to either the character's mental states or physical information. Example the angry stories included angry, annoyed and irritated. Correct responses to the embarrassment stories included mental state and physical information justifications are given in Appendix C (ii). embarrassed, stupid and humiliated.
Results. In Table 6 , the performance of J.S. on the emotion Results. In Table 7 , the performance of J.S. on the advanced attribution task is contrasted with that of C.L.A., 10 healthy Theory of Mind task is contrasted with that of C.L.A., and normal males, and five psychopathic and five nonthe psychopathic and non-psychopathic inmates. J.S. was psychopathic inmates. J.S. showed no difficulty making unimpaired on this task. His comprehension performance attributions of happiness and sadness to story characters.
(Total Score) was, like C.L.A.'s, flawless. Chi-square analyses However, J.S. showed profound difficulty in attributing demonstrated that J.S. was not significantly less likely to fear, anger or embarrassment. He ignored the threatening make mental state justifications than any of the comparison component in the fear stories, and stated that the protagonist populations. would feel nothing or 'confusion' in the anger and embarrassment stories. C.L.A.'s performance did not differ Comment. In this task, we documented that J.S. had no significantly from that of the comparison populations. impairment in attributing mental states. This result suggests that his emotion attribution impairment was not underpinned
Comment. The results of this task showed that J.S. had by a Theory of Mind impairment.
remarkable difficulty in attributing fear, anger and embarrassment to characters. The significance of these findings will be discussed further.
Task 10: the moral/conventional distinction task J.S. presented with profoundly aberrant behaviour. Grafman interpreted his findings of high levels of aggression in patients
Task 9: advanced Theory of Mind task
The previous task indicated that J.S. was impaired in the with lesions to the ventromedial frontal cortex in terms of an inability to access 'social schema knowledge' stored in attribution of fear, anger and embarrassment. In Task 9, we investigated whether J.S.'s emotion attribution impairment the frontal lobes (e.g. Grafman, 1994; Grafman et al., 1996) . This might predict that J.S. should show impairment in social might reflect dysfunctional Theory of Mind. 19.7, P Ͻ 0.01 for C.L.A. and the poorest-performing nonand conventional (i.e. social disorder-based; talking in class) psychopathic inmate, respectively]. The psychopathic inmates which are distinguished by children from the age of 36 performed like J.S., judging the conventional transgressions months (Smetana and Braeges, 1990) . Moral transgressions as very serious. In addition, unlike C.L.A. and the nonare judged more serious than conventional transgressions, psychopathic subjects, J.S. judged that in the absence of and they continue, unlike conventional transgressions, to be prohibiting rules, both moral and conventional transgressions judged as non-permissible even in the absence of prohibiting were not permissible. Chi-square analyses revealed that J.S. rules. In Task 10, we investigated J.S.'s performance on the was significantly less likely to distinguish the moral and moral/conventional distinction test.
conventional transgressions in the absence of prohibiting rules (χ 2 ϭ 13.8 and 10.3, P Ͻ 0.01 for C.L.A. and the Procedure. The moral/conventional distinction stories were poorest-performing non-psychopathic inmate, respectively].
taken from the literature (e.g. Turiel et al., 1987; The psychopathic inmates, like J.S., judged both moral and 1995). Nine moral and nine conventional transgressions were conventional transgressions to be non-permissible in the presented to the participants in a randomized order. Four absence of prohibiting rules. questions presented in a fixed order after each story had been read were used to assess the moral/conventional distinction.
Comment. J.S. showed profound impairment on the moral/
Examples of the transgressions used and the four questions conventional distinction test. J.S., like the comparison are described in Appendix C (iii).
populations, judged the moral and conventional transgressions to be equally non-permissible. This suggests some access to
Results. In Table 7 , the performance of J.S. on the moral/ 'social schema knowledge'; J.S. knows which behaviours conventional distinction is contrasted with that of C.L.A., society prohibits. However, unlike C.L.A. and the nonand the psychopathic and non-psychopathic inmates. J.S. psychopathic inmates, J.S. judged the conventional showed no impairment in knowledge about the normal transgressions to be as serious as the moral transgressions permissibility of the transgressions read to him. Unlike C.L.A. and considered the conventional transgressions to be nonand the non-psychopathic subjects, J.S. judged both the permissible even in the absence of prohibiting rules. In these moral and conventional transgressions as extremely serious. respects, J.S.'s and the psychopathic inmates' performance ANOVAs revealed that J.S. judged the conventional transgressions as significantly more serious than both C.L.A.
was similar. Three scores were obtained for this task (see Table 8 ).Two Results. In Table 8 , the performance of J.S. on the social aversion through classical conditioning (Blair, 1995) .
situations task is contrasted with that of C.L.A., 10 healthy However, there are other emotional reactions that influence controls, and five psychopathic and five non-psychopathic our judgements of the appropriateness of behaviour. There inmates. J.S. was at the lower end of the healthy control are acts for which there are no formal societal prohibitions range in his ability to identify normative situations. However, but which may induce anger or irritation in observers; for while C.L.A. and the healthy controls identified almost all example intimately touching another's child. In Task 11, we of the norm violations, J.S. identified significantly fewer. His investigated whether J.S. was able to judge the appropriateness score was significantly lower than those of appropriateness of behaviours that may induce anger in the comparison populations. observers.
Comment. J.S. showed no clear impairment in identifying
Procedure. Nine short stories describing social situations normative situations. In contrast, he was strikingly impaired incorporating behaviour that was either normative or a in identifying social violations. He was significantly poorer violation were read by the patient (see Dewey, 1991) . At than the comparison populations in judging behaviours that various points in each story, the patient was asked to comment are considered likely to induce anger in observers as being on how appropriate the behaviour was, giving a score from inappropriate. This was despite his intact knowledge of A to D. 'A' scores meant that he judged the situation as formal social rules (see Task 10 ). normative. 'B' to 'D' scores meant that he judged the situation as a norm violation and indexed the extent of the violation ('B' scores being mild and 'D' being serious). Previous piloting on a large, independent sample of healthy
Task 12: a revised social situations task
In the previous task, we obtained evidence that J.S. was controls had resulted in the identification of a set of consistently identified normative situations and violations. impaired in judging the appropriateness of behaviours that may induce anger in observers. The purpose of Task 12 was This piloting had also indicated that the most commonly attributed emotion of observers to the violations was anger.
to extend and replicate the results of Task 11 by using rather more extreme norm violations. These should engender even The task instructions and an example story are presented in Appendix C (iv).
stronger expectations of anger in observers. Thus, the stories in Task 12 dealt with issues such as violent aggression and profound expression recognition impairment could not be attributed to a general face processing impairment given his public nudity [see Appendix C (v) for an example story].
intact performance on a range of face processing tasks (Task 5). Nor could his emotional responding impairment be
Procedure. The procedure used in Task 12 was identical to that used in Task 11. Nineteen short stories describing attributed to a general impairment in generating autonomic responses given his appropriate responding to auditory stimuli social situations were read to the patient who was asked at various points in each story to comment on the (Task 6). In addition, J.S. showed impairment on most of the appropriateness of the behaviour of the story protagonists.
social cognition tasks. He failed to attribute fear, anger and embarrassment to others (Task 8). He failed to discriminate
Results. In Table 8 , the performance of J.S. on the revised social situations task is contrasted with that of C.L.A., transgressions which result in victims (moral) and those which result in social disorder (conventional) (Task 10) and the healthy controls, and the psychopathic and the nonpsychopathic inmates. J.S. again showed a preserved ability to judge inappropriate behaviours likely to induce anger in observers (Tasks 11 and 12). In stark contrast, his ability to to identify normative situations correctly. However, unlike the comparison populations, J.S. was again seriously and attribute mental states on the Theory of Mind task was preserved (Task 9). Unlike J.S., C.L.A. showed no impairment significantly impaired in his ability to judge the actions likely to cause anger in others as being inappropriate.
on any of these tasks. Unlike J.S., the inmates with developmental psychopathy had no difficulty attributing emotional states to story protagonists and had no difficulty
Comment. The results of Tasks 11 and 12 indicated that J.S. was impaired in making behavioural appropriateness judging behaviours likely to induce anger in observers as being inappropriate (Tasks 11 and 12). However, like J.S., they judgements reliant on the formation of expectations about the angry reactions of others.
also failed the moral/conventional distinction test (Task 10).
Discussion

Alternative explanations for J.S.'s acquired
Following a bilateral trauma to the frontal region which involved orbitofrontal cortex, J.S. presented with severe sociopathy J.S.'s behavioural disturbance and pattern of performance on behavioural disturbance and a profound impairment on a range of tests sensitive to frontal lobe dysfunction. His the cognitive tasks cannot be explained easily within existing general accounts of aberrant behaviour/acquired sociopathy aberrant behaviour fulfilled the criteria for Antisocial Personality Disorder (DSM-IV, 1994) and can be described following frontal lobe damage. Damasio and colleagues have explained acquired sociopathy in terms of damage to the as 'acquired sociopathy' ; J.S. was notably aggressive and was reckless regarding the safety of others.
somatic marker system (e.g. . Damasio suggested that somatic markers provide signals of the We investigated the basis of his acquired sociopathy. In particular, we assessed the processes thought to be implicated inappropriateness of particular behaviours, allowing their rejection. The absence of these signals prevents inappropriate in acquired sociopathy, i.e. reversal learning, expression recognition, emotional responding and social cognition. This courses of action from being rejected and causes behavioural disturbance. Two experimental findings have been used to allowed some insight into the specific impairments that may underlie acquired sociopathy and their interactions. Moreover, support the somatic marker system model. The first is that patients who present with acquired sociopathy fail to show this study directly compared: (i) a dysexecutive patient with aberrant behaviour (J.S.) with a dysexecutive patient without autonomic responses to visually presented social stimuli under passive viewing conditions (e.g. Tranel and Damasio, aberrant behaviour (C.L.A.); and (ii) 'acquired sociopathy' with developmental psychopathy. 1994). The second is that patients with acquired sociopathy perform poorly on the Four-Pack Card-Playing task (e.g. The results of the experimental investigation revealed that J.S. showed no impairment on two reversal learning tasks Bechara et al., 1994) . J.S.'s failure to generate autonomic responses to visually salient stimuli would be compatible (Tasks 1 and 2). In contrast, both C.L.A. and the inmates with developmental psychopathy presented with impairments with impairment in the somatic marker system. However, his preserved performance on the Four-Pack Card-Playing task in one of the two tasks (Task 1 for C.L.A. and Task 2 for the inmates, respectively). J.S., despite a preserved would not. Moreover, J.S. showed reduced autonomic activity under active viewing conditions; when he was asked either performance on reversal learning tasks, showed a profound impairment on expression recognition and emotional to name the expression displayed or to award a score for the quality of the picture. These differences between J.S.'s pattern responding tasks (Task 3 and 4). In contrast, patient C.L.A. presented with a selective deficit in the recognition of sadness.
of performance and that reported for previous patients with acquired sociopathy indicate that J.S.'s impairment cannot The inmates with developmental psychopathy presented with no emotion recognition impairment but a specific impairment be explained satisfactorily within the somatic marker system hypothesis. in emotional responding to sad and fearful expressions. J.S.'s Rolls related the aberrant behaviour to dysfunction in emotional signals). Thus, it appears inappropriate to postulate a unitary social cognition module. Rather it appears that altering behaviour appropriately in response to reinforcement contingency changes . However, J.S. did not there are dissociable, perhaps interlocking, systems involved in social cognition. appear impaired in the reversal learning tasks requiring the modification of behaviour according to reinforcement
In addition to the specific positions outlined above, there are at least two more general accounts that could offer contingency changes. Thus, Rolls' account cannot easily interpret his behavioural disturbance.
explanations of J.S.'s data. The first is developed from the suggestion that the frontal lobes allow abstraction (e.g. Grafman and colleagues (e.g. Grafman, 1994; Grafman et al., 1996) have argued that 'knowledge stored in the Fletcher et al., 1995) . Indeed, J.S. (and C.L.A.) presented with concrete interpretations in the proverbs tasks. It could human prefrontal cortex plays a managerial role in the control of behavior and takes the form of mental models, thematic therefore be suggested that J.S.'s acquired sociopathy was due to an inability to abstract an appropriate behavioural understanding, plans and social rules. . . . Within this framework, we would expect that lesions to the prefrontal plan from the environment. Thus, for example, J.S.'s impairment on the social situations tasks might be due to an cortex would impair the ability to access and sustain such managerial knowledge.' He has suggested that low rather than inability to generate abstract representations of appropriate high frequency knowledge units would be more susceptible to social behaviour. However, such an interpretation could not degradation. In addition, he suggested that 'this impairment easily account for J.S.'s preserved performance on the Theory would bias the regulation and expression of behavior away of Mind task which clearly requires the representation of an from plans, social rules, and mental schemas towards abstract mental state. In addition, C.L.A. also presented with environmental hyper-responsiveness, making spontaneously an impairment in abstraction on the proverbs test, yet he had appearing or reactive aggressive and violent behavior more no difficulties on the social situations test. likely' (Grafman et al., , p. 1237 . However, Grafman's A second general account could be offered in terms of an position has difficulty accounting for J.S.'s pattern of inhibition failure. The frontal lobes are thought to allow performance. For example, J.S. showed difficulty with the behavioural inhibition and regulation (e.g. Fuster, 1980 ; moral/conventional distinction task. Yet all the transgressions . Indeed, it has been suggested that violence described should be considered high frequency knowledge in frontally impaired patients is due to the patients' inability to units as they concern common transgressions (e.g. one person inhibit their violence impulses (e.g. Barratt, 1994 ; Krakowski hitting another, talking in class). Moreover, he clearly had et al., 1997). However, a diminished inhibition account lacks access to the knowledge that the transgressions were specificity. We administered two tests thought to require the prohibited. Rather, his impairment was in judging the inhibition of a dominant response (Hayling and Stroop). J.S. conventional transgressions as too serious and not modulating showed impairment on the Hayling but intact performance his responding with respect to the conventional transgressions on the Stroop task. Moreover, C.L.A., who showed no following the removal of the prohibitory rules.
acquired sociopathy, was impaired on both tests. Of course, Baron-Cohen has suggested that the impairment of patients it would be possible to suggest that J.S. had suffered a deficit with acquired sociopathy can be accounted for in terms of in a specific system that normally inhibited his aggression. damage to the neural circuit that mediates Theory of Mind However, this would be little more than a redescription of (Baron-Cohen, 1995) . However, J.S. did not perform poorly his symptomatology and would certainly not predict his on the Theory of Mind task. This suggests that the acquired pattern of impairment on the cognitive tasks. sociopathy need not reflect Theory of Mind impairment. This is in line with the finding of Saver and Damasio that E.V.R.
A comparison between developmental and
was unimpaired in a test that required representing potential acquired psychopathy mental states (Saver and Damasio, 1991) .
Damasio has suggested that an impairment in the somatic Brothers implicated the orbitofrontal cortex in a neural marker system may be the underlying cause not only of circuit including the amygdala, anterior cingulate gyrus and 'acquired sociopathy' but also of developmental psychopathy temporal pole that functions as a unitary social 'editor' (Damasio et al., 1990; . This predicts that (Brothers, 1995 (Brothers, , 1997 . She argues against the idea of similarities should be observed between the two disorders. dissociating what she terms 'cold' social cognition (i.e.
Indeed, the clinical and empirical picture of the developmental attributing beliefs; Theory of Mind) from 'hot' social psychopath describes an individual who, like J.S., is highly cognition (i.e. processing others' emotional expressions). It aggressive and has an emotional deficit (reduced fear and is not clear to what extent Brothers would use the social guilt; e.g. Cleckley, 1964; Aniskiewicz, 1979; Hare, 1993 ; editor model as a model of the acquired sociopathy shown Patrick et al., 1993; Blair, 1995 (Hare, 1993) . In precede a sense of embarrassment and perhaps others' contrast, J.S.'s aggression was never instrumental. It was disgusted expressions), i.e. situations where another's anger usually a result of frustration at the interruption of his might be expected. We suggest that J.S. may have suffered behavioural routines and, sometimes, for his entertainment damage to such a system. (e.g. pushing the screaming woman around in her wheelchair).
In terms of performance on the social situations tasks, we J.S. and the psychopathic inmates also showed striking suggest that successful performance on these tasks requires differences in their performance on the experimental tasks.
that the representation of the situation activates an association J.S. had a severe problem in recognizing emotional with analogous situations where others have shown anger. expressions (particularly anger and disgust), showed severe For example, the Keith story [see Appendix C (ii)] has and general deficits in autonomic responding and was components of inappropriate intimacy and the touching of impaired on all of the social cognition tasks with the exception another's property that may initiate anger in others. Certainly, of Theory of Mind. In contrast, the psychopathic inmates piloting indicated that most subjects anticipated that the had no expression recognition deficit, showed a selective baby's mother will be annoyed, or perhaps distressed, to deficit in autonomic responses to sad and fearful expressions discover an unknown man, Keith, fiddling with her baby's and did not show any deficit on the social cognition tasks, nappy. J.S., unlike healthy individuals, was unable to realize with the exception of the moral/conventional distinction task.
that some actions, such as checking a baby's nappy, while These distinctive patterns cannot be attributed to severity neutral or even reinforcing in many contexts (through the of deficit, since the performance of the individuals with cessation of the baby's cries), are inappropriate in other developmental psychopathy and that of J.S. overlapped contexts. We suggest either that J.S. did not activate the depending on the experimental task. For example, the representations of situations that previously have been individuals with developmental psychopathy, but not J.S., associated with other individual's angry responses or that were impaired on one task of reversal learning (the Onethese representations could no longer modify his on-going Pack Card-Playing task). Thus, these distinctive patterns of behaviour. Thus, J.S. did not realize the inappropriateness of performance of J.S. and the individuals with developmental the behaviours. This cannot be attributed easily to lack of psychopathy do not support the notion that an impairment in knowledge about social rules or social plans. Indeed, there the same cognitive system is the cause of both 'acquired are no explicit social rules or social plans concerning these sociopathy' and developmental psychopathy. It has been instances. Their inappropriateness is a function of the suggested that psychopathy is a potential developmental associations with other individual's reactions to the behaviour. consequence of dysfunction within a neuro-cognitive system It should be noted that the above account may also be which responds to the sad and frightened faces of others applicable to those patients who, following orbitofrontal (Blair, 1995; Blair et al., 1997 Blair et al., , 1999 . Individuals with cortex damage, presented with aggression (e.g. Grafman psychopathy do not find acts that cause harm to others et al., 1996) . However, it is not intended to explain all the aversive and fail to learn not to do these acts. The sudden cognitive impairments that can be observed in patients with onset of J.S.'s behavioural disturbance following his acquired orbitofrontal cortex damage. For example, patient E.V.R.'s bankruptcy is more likely to have been due to a more brain damage makes the explanation of his aberrant behaviour general planning or decision-making deficit . in terms of a developmental dysfunction difficult. Instead, Similarly, the difficulties in shopping shown in two patients we believe that J.S. has suffered impairment to a system that with orbitofrontal cortex lesions reported by Shallice and is involved in the social on-line regulation of behaviour.
Burgess is likely to reflect dysfunction within a more general decision-making system (Shallice and Burgess, 1991) . Indeed, it is important to note that neither E.V.R. nor the patients
A new account of acquired sociopathy
reported by Shallice and Burgess were documented as So how can one explain J.S.'s performance? The essential presenting with aggression or difficulties with anger features that marked J.S.'s impairment as distinct from management. We predict that it is only patients with these the difficulties shown by C.L.A. and the individuals with behaviours that will have impairment to the system described developmental psychopathy were his impairment in above. The orbitofrontal cortex is the third major division recognizing, and responding to, angry expressions and his of the frontal cortex (Fuster, 1991) . We suggest that the remarkably poor performance on the social situations tasks.
orbitofrontal cortex is involved not only in reversal learning Angry expressions are known to curtail the behaviour of to human social-emotional signals but also in a number of others in situations where social rules or expectations have other cognitive processes. been violated (e.g. Averill, 1982) . Thus, the suggestion here is that there is a system that is activated by another's angry expressions and which extinguishes on-going behaviour and
Anatomical considerations
reverses the current response in favour of another. It is Although we are unable to delineate its exact extent, the CT scan revealed that J.S. had bilateral damage to the frontal suggested that this system may be activated by representations lobes involving the orbitofrontal cortex. Damage to the frontal Conclusions lobes has long been implicated in causing a heightened risk As far as we are aware, this is the first study attempting to of aggression (e.g. Blumer and Benson, 1975; Hecaen and assess the processes implicated in the development of Albert, 1978; Stuss et al., 1992; Damasio, 1995) . Specifically, acquired sociopathy contemporaneously in the same patient. Damasio (e.g. Damasio, 1994) , Grafman (Grafman et al., Moreover, it directly compared the performance of a patient 1996) and Volavka (Volavka, 1995) have stressed the with acquired sociopathy with cases of developmental importance of orbitofrontal cortex in modulating appropriate psychopathy and with a patient with frontal dysexecutive social behaviour/inhibiting aggression. Also, Rolls and syndrome. We are able to conclude the following. (i) Acquired colleagues have reported generalized expression recognition sociopathy needs to be distinguished from developmental impairment following orbitofrontal cortex damage (Hornak psychopathy. While both acquired sociopathy and et al., 1996) . In addition, a recent PET functional imaging developmental psychopathy may be associated with emotional study has suggested that the right orbitofrontal cortex is impairments, we propose that the natures of these impairments involved in the neural response to angry expressions (Blair are different. (ii) Acquired sociopathy need not be associated et al., 1999) . In line with this, J.S. showed generalized with general reversal learning impairments (see also Rolls, expression recognition difficulties. Moreover, when compared 1996). (iii) Acquired sociopathy is not an inevitable result with the control subjects, his difficulties were notably striking of executive dysfunction even to 'inhibition' or 'abstraction' for anger and disgust.
systems. We argue that the distinctive features of the 'acquired Furthermore, the neuropsychological evidence provided by sociopathy' of J.S. were due to impairment to a system which the present case, in the context of previous findings, provides responds to angry expressions/expectations of others' anger. strong support for the functional specialization of the frontal This system may be particularly involved in the suppression cortex. Indeed, it suggests specialization of the frontal cortex of socially aberrant behaviour. Moreover, it appears that for separable systems for social cognition. One system for social cognition is not mediated by a unitary system. There social cognition allows the representation of the mental states appear to be multiple neurocognitive systems that are involved of other individuals (Theory of Mind). Neuroimaging studies in social cognition. Given the importance of these systems have indicated that the representation of the mental states of for successful existence in society, their further delineation others incorporates medial frontal cortex (e.g. Fletcher et al., is clearly needed. 1995; Goel et al., 1995; Gallagher et al., 2000) . J.S. did not show any impairment in the representation of mental states. This suggests that his medial frontal cortex was intact. We propose a second system that responds to angry expressions/ as argued above, this overlap in cognitive impairment was unlikely to underpin his socially aberrant behaviour. Yet it is American Psychiatric Association. Diagnostic and statistical manual interesting to consider whether the aggressive socially of mental disorders. DSM-I. Washington (DC): American Psychiatric aberrant behaviour shown by J.S. and other cases might Association, 1952. be dependent on damage to both orbitofrontal cortex and American Psychiatric Association. Diagnostic and statistical manual amygdala. In addition, it is interesting to consider whether of mental disorders. DSM-III. 3rd edn. Washington (DC): American there might be a form of developmental psychopathy that is Psychiatric Association, 1980. due to orbitofrontal cortex damage and impairment in the system which responds to angry expressions/expectations of American Psychiatric Association. Diagnostic and statistical manual anger. These questions can only be addressed with further of mental disorders. DSM-III-R. 3rd rev edn. Washington (DC): American Psychiatric Association, 1987. research.
